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Enhancing the Legitimacy of the
World Trade Organization: Why the
United States and the European Union
Should Support the Advisory Centre
on WTO Law
ABSTRACT

The World Trade Organization (WTO) has faced harsh
criticism from developing nations in recent years. Many
developing nations feel that the promises they received when
they joined the WTO have not been fulfilled. These nations feel
that wealthy, industrializednations like the United States and
the members of the European Union are the only ones that have
benefited from the organization. Moreover, they feel that these
developed nations have benefited at their expense through the
WTO's dispute settlement process. Many improvements to the
WTO have been proposed. However, the one that seems the most
able to help developing nations, the Advisory Centre on WTO
Law (ACWL), has not received support from either the United
States or the European Union.
The Advisory Centre was established in 2001 and is the
first center for legal aid in the internationalsystem. The goal of
the Advisory Centre is to provide developing nations with
training and legal assistance in WTO matters. The WTO is an
intricate system of rights and obligations, supported by a
binding dispute settlement mechanism to ensure compliance.
Meaningful participation in the WTO requires a good
understandingof these rights and obligations and the ability to
participatein its dispute settlement mechanism. The ACWL has
the potential to benefit every nation that participates in the
WTO, not just developing nations. The ACWL legitimizes the
WTO as a whole. When parties are equally represented, the
entire system is legitimated. Therefore, both the United States
and the European Union would ultimately benefit from
supportingthis organization.
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I. INTRODUCTION

A new non-governmental international organization has been
established to provide developing and least-developed countries with
high-quality legal advice for disputes involving the World Trade
Organization (WTO).' This organization, the Advisory Centre for
World Trade Law (ACWL), was first conceived by a trade delegate
from Colombia. 2 Many developed and developing countries have
3
contributed both financial and moral support to the organization,
4
which has been quite successful in its first years of operation.
Surprisingly, however, neither the United States nor the European
Union has shown interest in supporting the organization. 5
This lack of support does not make sense for several reasons.
First, the lack of support from the United States and the European

1.
Establishing the Advisory Centre on WTO Law, available at
http://www.itd.orgflinks/acwladvis.htm.
2.
Frieder Roessler, Executive Director of the Advisory Centre on WTO Law,
Address at the Inauguration of the ACWL (October 5, 2001), available at
http://www.acwl.ch/e/tools/news-e.aspx.
3.
Thaddeus McBride, Rejuvenating the WTO: Why the U.S. Must Assist
Developing Countries in Trade Disputes, 11 INT'L LEGAL PERSP. 65, 69-70 (1999).
4.

See infra Part III.B and accompanying notes.

5.

See infra Part IV and accompanying notes.
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Union contravenes their national and supranational policies
regarding fair representation. 6 The justice systems in both the United
States and the European Union are seen by many nations as models
of equal justice because of their commitment to ensuring that
defendants are adequately represented. 7 Second, the WTO has faced
substantial criticism in recent years primarily because many
developing countries feel that they are not getting what they were
promised when they joined the WTO. 8 By ensuring that developing
countries are on equal footing with developed nations in the dispute
settlement process, the ACWL has helped stem this criticism and
given developing countries hope for their future in the WTO. 9 For
example, Peru, represented by the ACWL, has received a favorable
Appellate Body decision in a dispute with the European Union,
something that may not have been possible without the help of the
Centre. 10 Finally, providing developing countries with equal access to
the WTO dispute settlement process provides the legitimacy to the
WTO. 11 However, before it is possible adequately to explain the many
advantages of the ACWL, it is first necessary to provide a preliminary
explanation of the WTO and its dispute settlement process.
A. The Structure of the WTO
The WTO Agreements provide the legal basis for the multilateral
trading system that was established on January 1, 1995.12 It is also
the preliminary text of the Uruguay Round agreements signed on
April 15, 1994 in Marrakesh. 13 The process and substance envisioned
under these agreements extends far beyond that included in the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the predecessor of
the WTO. 14 While the GATT dealt only with trade in goods, the new
WTO expanded the scope to trade in services and trade-related
intellectual property. 15

6.

See infra notes 255-62 and accompanying text.

7.

See id.

8.
See infra text accompanying notes 71.86.
9.
See infra notes 273-75 and accompanying text.
10.
See generally European Communities-Trade Description of Sardines, Report
of the Appellate Body (AB-2002-3),
195, available at http://www.worldtradelaw.net/
reports/wtoab/ec-sardines(ab).pdf.
11.
See infra notes 268-69 and accompanying text.
12.

WTO SECRETARIAT, GUIDE TO THE URUGUAY ROUND AGREEMENTS 1 (2002)

[hereinafter WTO SECRETARIAT].
13.
Id. at 1.
14.
Id. at 1-2.
15.

Id. at 2.
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At the initiation of the Uruguay Round of negotiations, the need
16
to establish a new international organization was not anticipated.
However, as the Round drew to a close, the results of the debates and
discussions were increasingly seen as a coherent agreement to which
17
all countries that had participated in the Round should adhere. Of
special interest to the participants was the creation of a dispute
settlement system that would govern issues arising under the many
agreements.' 8 Most participants "saw great advantage in giving a
clear, logical, and strong institutional structure to the post-Uruguay
Round trading system." 19 The end result is the WTO, composed of
sixteen short articles and four annexes. 20 The annexes include other
Uruguay Round agreements and GATT provisions that have been
21
carried over into the WTO.
Article III of the WTO agreement defines its five primary
functions. The first function is "to facilitate the implementation,
administration and operation, and further the objectives, of this
Agreement and of the Multilateral Trade Agreements, and also to
provide the framework for the implementation, administration and
operation of the Plurilateral Trade Agreements. ' '22 The second is to be
a "negotiating forum. '23 The administration of the "arrangements in
Annexes 2 and 3 for the settlement of disputes that may arise
between members and for the review of trade policies" are
respectively the third and fourth functions. 24 Finally, the WTO is to
cooperate with the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank
25
in order to attain greater policy-making coherence.
A country becomes a member of the WTO in two ways. 26 The
first way, "Original Membership," applied solely to nations that were
members of the GATT, and was open to these nations for a limited
time. 27 Original Members were required to accept the WTO
agreement without reservations and to make "concessions and
commitments for goods and services, embodied in schedules that had
been duly accepted and annexed. '28 Least-developed countries (LDCs)
that became original members were essentially subject to the same
conditions, but were "only required to take commitments and

16.

Id.

17.

Id.

18.
19.
20.

WTO SECRETARIAT, supranote 12, at 2.
Id.
Id.

21.

Id.

22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Id. at 4.
Id.
WTO SECRETARIAT, supra note 12, at 4.
Id.
Id. at 11.
Id.
Id.
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concessions to the extent consistent with their individual
development, financial or trade needs, or their administrative and
institutional capabilities. ' 29 The second means by which a country
may become
a member of the WTO is through the process of
"accession." 30 Accession is open to any nation indefinitely, and
essentially means that terms of membership are negotiated between
the nation wishing to join and the nations that are already
members. 3 1 These terms are unspecified but are intended to put the
joining country on equal footing with that of other members. 32 Once
membership is realized, all states have the same rights and
33
privileges, and the manner by which a nation joined is irrelevant.
All countries must pay their share of expenses, and all must conform
34
their government's laws and regulations to the WTO rules.
The backbone of the WTO is the Ministerial Conference, which is
composed of all WTO members and meets at least biannually. 35 When
the Ministerial Conference is not in session, the WTO is led by the
General Council, which is also composed of all members. 36 The
Council is responsible for the continuous management of the WTO,
meeting regularly to supervise all its work.37 It is also responsible for
convening as the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) and as the Trade
Policy Review Body. 38 Meetings of these bodies take place quite
frequently; the DSB meets, on average, once a month and the Trade
Policy Review Body meets even more often. 39 In the main, decision
making in the WTO is done on the basis of consensus. 40 When there is
formal voting, each member of the WTO has one vote, and the general
rule is that the decisions of the Ministerial Council or the General
41
Council are made by the majority of votes cast.
B. The WTO Dispute Settlement Process
Article 3.2 of the WTO Agreement states, "The dispute
settlement system of the WTO is a central element in providing

29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

WTO SECRETARIAT, supra note 12, at 11.
Id.
Id. at 11-12.
Id. at 12.
Id. at 11.
Id. at 12.
WTO SECRETARIAT, supra note 12, at 6.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 13.

41.

WTO SECRETARIAT, supra note 12, at 13.
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security and predictability to the multilateral trading system. '42 The
Dispute Settlement System outlined by the WTO is a "single set of
rules to cover disputes that may arise under any element of the
Uruguay Round package," including the WTO itself and annexes
including the GATT. 43 The detailed rules are designed to ensure a
speedy settlement process that cannot be blocked by individual
44
countries.
The function of the dispute settlement system is to preserve and
clarify the rights and obligations of WTO member states. 45 Moreover,
dispute settlement procedures are calculated to "secure a positive,
and if possible, mutually acceptable, solution to a dispute. 4 6
Preferably, the solution is to withdraw the measures that are
inconsistent with obligations under the WTO Agreement.4 7 If the
withdrawal is not accomplished, compensation is a possible, although
less satisfactory result. 4 8 Retaliation, wherein the injured nation,
with authorization, suspends trade concessions or obligations to the
offending member, is the least desirable outcome.4 9 Unilateral action
taken by one country to redress what it views as violations of the
WTO is strictly forbidden; members are required to use the dispute
50
settlement procedures.
The dispute settlement system is governed by the single DSB,
composed of all of the members of the WTO. 51 This body alone has the
authority "to establish panels, adopt panel and appellate reports,
maintain
surveillance and implementation of rulings and
recommendations, and authorize suspension of concessions and
obligations. ' 52 Panels created by the DSB are an important part of
the structure of the dispute settlement process, and are convened to
carry out specific tasks, dissolving upon the completion of these
tasks. 53 There are "elaborate provisions on the composition, mandate,
tasks and procedures of panels. ' 54 For example, the panel must be
composed of three to five "well qualified governmental or nongovernmental individuals," from diverse backgrounds, and not from
the nations involved in the dispute, unless those nations so agree. 55

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Id. at 19-20.
Id. at 17.
See id.
Id. at 20.
Id.
WTO SECRETARIAT, supra note 12, at 20.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
WTO SECRETARIAT, supra note 12, at 21.
Id.
Id.
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The task of the panel is to "examine the matter referred to it 'in the
light of relevant provisions' of the agreements cited by the parties,
and 'to make such findings as will assist the DSB in making
recommendations or rulings under those agreements. '56 Upon
making its finding, the panel circulates a report to the DSB. 5 7
After circulation of the panel report, the parties to the dispute
are afforded the opportunity to appeal the issues of law and legal
interpretations developed by the panel.58 This appeal is heard by
three members of the seven-member Appellate Body, which has the
option of upholding, modifying, or reversing the legal conclusions of
the panel. 59 However, the report, "once adopted by the DSB, is to be
unconditionally accepted by the parties to the dispute. '60 The
Appellate Body is established by the DSB and consists of "persons of
recognized authority, with demonstrated expertise in law,
international trade and the subject mater of the covered agreements
generally and unaffiliated with any government . . . and broadly
representative of the WTO itself."'61 These members currently serve
62
four-year terms.
The progress of this dispute settlement process cannot be blocked
unless there is consensus by the DSB to do so. 63 Thus, if a panel is
established and a panel report is approved, an Appellate Body
decision will be adopted and approved unless there is consensus to
the contrary. 64 Such a consensus would be extremely rare because the
nation that requested the panel, for example, would be unlikely to
65
change its mind.

II. THE NEED FOR WTO REFORM: ENSURING THAT DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES HAVE EQUALITY OF ACCESS TO THE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT
PROCESS
While the WTO is technically one of the most democratic of
global organizations because it has a one-country, one-vote system, a
recent U.N. report cautions that, "superficial equality masks the deep
inequalities created by a system in which there exists severe

56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 22.
WTO SECRETARIAT, supra note 12, at 22.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 23.
Id.
WTO SECRETARIAT, supra note 12, at 23.
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disparities in bargaining power of the member countries. '66 Many of
the trade rules are presumed to be unfair because of the large
disparities in income and development between countries.67 The
smaller economies that are typical of developing countries make them
"uniquely vulnerable" in the area of trade: "In other words,
international trade exacerbates existing problems in the distribution
of resources, and creates new ones-the rich can get richer, and the
poor poorer."68 One of the biggest accusations leveled at the WTO is
that developed nations are "manipulating international trade and
economic policies to [their] sole benefit, with little regard for the
'69
needs of developing states.
Both the original GATT agreement and the WTO include express
recognitions that these agreements should be used to help developing
countries. For example, the preamble to the Agreement establishing
the WTO recognized the "need for positive efforts designed to ensure
that developing countries, and especially the least developed among
them, secure a share in the growth in international trade
'70
commensurate with the needs of their economic development.
Despite this lofty goal, the actual experience of developing countries
71
involved in the GATT and WTO has been disappointing.
Many developing countries have tried to discuss their concerns
at WTO meetings but feel that developed nations have either ignored
their proposals, or worse, rejected them altogether. For instance, at
the WTO's Third Ministerial Meeting held in Seattle, Washington in
1999, trade representatives from developing countries indicated that
their interests and participation in the WTO were being
"marginalized by developed nations, and that those already holding
an unequal share of the world's natural and social resources continue
to receive an unequal share of the gains from trade." 72 Developing
countries drafted a list of their priorities for the Seattle meeting
agenda in which they "determined to rectify what they see as a bias
in current trade rules that have benefited larger economic powers at

66.

Padideh Ala'i, Symposium, Global Trade Issues in the New Millennium: A

Human Rights Critique of the WTO: Some Preliminary Observations, 33 GEO. WASH.
INT'L L. REV. 537, 541 (2000) (citing U.N. Commission on Human Rights, 52d Sess.,
Provisional Agenda Item 4, P15, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2000/13).

67.
See generally Isabella D. Bunn, The Right to Development: Implications for
InternationalEconomic Law, 15 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 1425 (2000).
68.

Frank

J. Garcia,

Trade and Inequality: Economic Justice and the

Developing World, 21 MICH. J. INT'L L. 975, 979 (2000).
69.
McBride, supra note 3, at 68.
70.
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade-Multilateral Trade Negotiations
(the Uruguay Round): Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round Trade
Negotiations, Dec. 15, 1993, 33 I.L.M. 1 (1994).
71.
McBride, supra note 3, at 65.
72.
Garcia, supra note 68, at 977.
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their expense. '73 However, their list of priorities "was mysteriously
deleted from the first formal draft of the agenda that was circulated
at the organization's Geneva headquarters. ' 74 Members of the
developing countries were irate, especially in light of the fact that the
Seattle meeting had been hailed by the WTO's new Director General,
Mike Moore, as a forum meant for them. 75 Although no countries
were blamed publicly for the elimination of the developing countries'
agenda, the United States was mentioned and "accused of bullying
tactics." 76 As one representative noted, "It was too convenient. Every
'77
single item developing countries wanted was eliminated.
Kofi Annan, the Secretary General of the United Nations, later
criticized the developed nations for the eventual breakdown of the
Seattle trade talks. 78 Annan noted that "[d]eveloping nations played a
more 'active and united role' in the Seattle talks than ever
before ... while the industrial powers bickered among themselves
and showed that they did not have the will to carry out reforms in the
rules that govern the international trading system. ' 79 He further
criticized industrialized nations for excluding developing countries
from the benefits of global trade through the use of protectionist trade
80
barriers.
In February 2000, the U.N. held a conference on developing
countries. While there were "expressions of good will," there was "no
real narrowing of the differences that split a meeting of the World
Trade Organization in Seattle in December." 8' Shri Suresh Pachouri,
a delegate from India, stated that, "The rules of the WTO have been
framed mainly keeping in view the interests of the industrialized
countries."8 2 He asserted that guidelines and rules established by the
WTO "ignored the political, social and economic conditions of
developing countries. '8 3 In a keynote address, the crowd applauded
when President Abdelaziz Bouteflika of Algeria declared, "The havenots are funding the haves. '8 4 Bouteflika was at the U.N. conference
speaking as a representative of African nations, and said that Africa,

73.
Elizabeth Olson, Anger on Agenda for World Trade Meeting, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 14, 1999, at C9.
74.
Id.
75.
Id.
76.
Id.
77.
Id.
78.
U.N. Chief Blames Rich Nations for Failure of Trade Talks, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 13, 2000, Sec. 1, at A12.
79.
Id.
80.
Id.
81.
Seth Mydans, U.N. Trade Meeting Brings Rich and Poor No Closer, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 20, 2000, at A16.
82.
Id.
83.
Id.
84.
Id.
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still recovering from centuries of colonialism'85"was now being crushed
by a new world order of international trade.
The relationship between the developing and developed countries
within the WTO has been an issue of major international concern for
years. One of the most important problems is that developing
countries do not feel that they have equal access to the dispute
settlement system process:
[The] participation of the developing countries in this system is, in the
opinion of many, absolutely vital to the long term durability and
effectiveness of the WTO dispute settlement system, and therefore,
probably the WTO itself. If the WTO is seen to be tilted, or unbalanced
with respect to an important attribute of membership, namely access to
the dispute settlement procedures, this undermines the sense of
86
fairness and, to some extent the essential value of being a member.

Developing countries have made more use of the WTO rules and
dispute settlement process than they did under the GATT.87 They
still do not bring a significant number of complaints. As of 1999,
developing countries initiated only forty-one dispute proceedings,
despite the fact that they make up three-quarters of the trade body's
membership. 88 In contrast, during the same period of time, the
United States initiated sixty proceedings, nearly one third of the
total, and the European Union initiated forty-five.8 9 Moreover, one
commentator noted that, "a price for using the system as a
complainant is that other countries began to feel that it is okay to
bring cases against these complainants" and developing countries
became targets. 90 From 1980 to 1994, developing states were
appellees in approximately thirteen percent of panel hearings,
however, since 1995 (the year the WTO entered into force) that
number has tripled. 91 Developing countries were targets of both the
United States and the European Union, with the United States
92
bringing three cases against them, and the European Union four. It
is believed that the dramatic increase in proceedings brought against
developing countries "is a clear response to the effort, initiated in the

85.
Id.
John H. Jackson, Perceptions About WTO Trade Institutions, Keynote
86.
Address at the Inauguration of the Advisory Centre for WTO Law (Oct. 5, 2001),
available at http://www.acwl.chle/tools/news-e.aspx.
87.
Symposium, InternationalEconomic Conflict and Resolution, Questions for
William J. Davey, 42 S. TEX. L. REV. 1209, 1213 (2001).
Daniel Pruzin, Advisory Center on WTO Law Proposed as Resource for
88.
PoorerMember Nations, 16 INT'L. TRADE REP. (BNA), No. 23, at 970-71 (June 9, 1999).
Id. at 970.
89.
Symposium, supra note 87, at 1213.
90.
91.
McBride, supra note 3, at 84.
See generally Young Duk Park & Marion Panizzon, WTO Dispute
92.
Settlement 1995-2001: A StatisticalAnalysis, 5 J. INT'L ECON. LAW 221 (2002).
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Uruguay Round, to increase the legal discipline of developing
93
states."
Although participation of developing countries in the dispute
settlement process appears to be on the rise, for the most part,
developing countries have familiarized themselves with the appellate
review process through participation as third party participants,
rather than as targets or complainants. 94 While developing countries
that have been third parties have likely enhanced their knowledge of
the functioning of the dispute settlement process through third-party
participation, only eleven developing countries have appeared before
the Appellate Body as appellants or appellees. 95 This is a major a
problem because there is "more to participation in the WTO dispute
settlement system than the preservation of the rights of individual
Members. '96 Another important function of the dispute settlement
system is to clarify existing WTO provisions, and "it is only through
engagement with the system that WTO members can influence the
outcome of rulings and recommendations, and thus contribute to the
growing body of WTO law. '97 Finally, even when developing countries
appear before the Appellate Body, their interests may be subjugated
98
to those of Western nations.
The primary reason that developing countries have had trouble
participating in the system is a lack of funding. 99 The cost of
initiating or defending a dispute is considerable and not easily borne
by
developing
countries
and, particularly,
least-developed
countries.1 0 0 It has been noted that there are multiple dimensions to
these costs. One problem is that many of the developing countries
that would like to participate in the dispute settlement process find
that they do not have the expertise in their government service and
ministries effectively to represent them in connection with the WTO

93.
McBride, supra note 3, at 84.
94.
Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, Address at the Inauguration of the Advisory
Centre of WTO Law (Oct. 5, 2001), availableat www.acwl.che/tools/news-e.aspx.
95.
Id.
96.
Id.
97.
Id.
98.
See McBride, supra note 3, at 68 (noting that in European CommunityBananas, Report of the Appellate Body, AB-1977-3, for instance, the debate between
the United States and the European Community obscured the fact that the developing
countries of Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean were influenced most by the
ultimate outcome of the dispute).
99.
Symposium, supra note 87, at 1213; see also Christopher Parlin, Review of
the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU), 31 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 565, 570
(noting that "[d]uring the DSU Review, Egypt, Guatemala, India, and Venezuela,
joined by Japan, said that the WTO's dispute settlement mechanism, including its
consultation process, failed to provide adequate access to developing countries [citing]
resource constraints and expense as the primary problems").
100.
Jackson, supra note 86.
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procedures: 10 1 "States need sophisticated expertise to modernize their
trade regulatory systems, comply with complex trade agreements,
and in general capitalize on the opportunities which trade
10 2
liberalization ... make available.'
Due to the lack of expertise within their own governments,
developing countries have been forced to look to outside legal
assistance. However, WTO procedures initially either prohibited or
greatly inhibited the use of private counsel by nation states, either
hired to work with them on cases, or to present cases in the WTO
procedures.' 0 3 These prohibitions were eventually eradicated in
European Communities-Regime for the Importation, Sale and
Distribution of Bananas, wherein the Appellate Body ruled that
private lawyers could represent the WTO Members in dispute
settlement proceedings. 10 4 This ruling was praised as allowing access
to the dispute settlement system by developing country members who
lacked the ability or necessary expertise to represent themselves.' 0 5
Currently, it is common for governments especially those of
smaller and developing countries to retain outside counsel to advise
them during disputes. 10 6 This said, the fees of such outside
representation can be staggering. The country must take into account
several considerations when determining whether to go to the
expense of hiring outside law firms or independent consultants,
including:
(1)
(2)
(3)

the relative importance of the case, both politically and
economically;
the complexity of the case;
the importance of winning-where a case is marginal, there is
advantage in having an outside agency to absorb any blame for
failure; or if losing is necessary to make an internal change, a
107
arms length relationship with private parties can be helpful.

At times, a private entity that is concerned with the outcome of the
dispute will pay for the attorneys, but often there is not private
concern for the outcome, "or there is a change in government policy

Id.
101.
102.
Garcia, supra note 68, at 1028.
103.
Jackson, supra note 86.
104.
Ehlermann, supra note 94.
Id.; see also McBride, supra note 3, at 90 (noting that in European
105.
Community-Bananas, Report of the Appellate Body, AB-1997-3, "the Appellate Body
explicitly recognized the importance of having competent legal counsel in all dispute
hearings, especially in matters brought before the Appellate Body. The Body also
stressed the importance of letting all states participate in matters pertinent to them.").
106.
Jackson, supra note 86.
Agency for International Trade Information and Cooperation Documents,
107.
Reports on Meetings, Improving Developing Country Access to the Dispute Settlement
Mechanism of the WTO (Feb. 25, 2000), available at http://www.acici.org/aitic/
documents/reports/reports5_eng.html) [hereinafter AITIC Documents].
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and the new government does not care about what the old
government did, and so the case is not adequately pursued."10 8
If the government does decide to pursue the dispute with the
help of outside counsel, it is generally forced to resort to law firms in
Washington, Geneva, or Brussels. 0 9 These firms may demand fees
matching those charged to their other clients which often include
corporations and wealthy governments. 110 Hourly rates for these
services may range from $200-$450 per hour."' There are often
incidental costs on top of this, including telephone calls, postage,
travel costs, and hotel bills. 112 The total cost of taking a dispute
before the DSB can be upwards of $300,000, an amount that is
113
beyond the means of many developing countries.

III. THE SOLUTION: THE ADVISORY CENTRE ON WTO LAW
Many proposals have been suggested to "level the playing field"
and to help the developing countries take a more active role in the
WTO through skilled and cost-efficient legal service. For instance, a
group of nine developing countries, including India, Pakistan, Cuba,
and Malaysia have recently suggested that wealthy nations who lose
disputes to developing countries should be forced to pay part of their
costs. 114 The idea that garnered the most attention and support,
however, was conceived of by Claudia Orozco of Colombia, who
believed that international legal assistance would be the most
effective way to help developing countries. 115
Several developing countries supported her proposal calling for
the establishment of an "independent legal center to provide advice to
developing countries in trade-related matters."'116 They reasoned that
"due to disparities in the finances and trade-related knowledge of
developing countries, such a center is necessary to allow these states
to participate fairly in WTO disputes. 11 7 As one diplomat from India

108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

Symposium, supra note 87, at 1214.
Id.; Jackson, supra note 86.
Jackson, supra note 86.
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Claim the System to Challenge Unfair Practicesby Richer Nations is Stacked Against
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noted, "[o]nce you join [the WTO] you have to run, if you don't run,
you fall aside. For running you need to have enough strength." 118
In Geneva on June 7, 1999 an official proposal for an Advisory
Centre on WTO Law was sponsored by a group of industrialized and
developing countries. 119 The proposed Centre would provide advisory
and legal assistance to developing countries in the WTO dispute
settlement process. 120 The sponsors hoped to attract enough founding
members and money to be able to launch it at the Seattle Ministerial
Meeting in November of that same year. 121 Nestor Osario, the
Columbian Ambassador, said that the Centre "would need as
founding and contributing members, some six to eight industrial
countries and some twenty developing countries to achieve the critical
mass to launch the initiative.' 1 22 In addition, an initial fund of $8
million and a donor contribution of $6 million for each of the first five
years would be needed to make the center viable and self-supporting
123
beginning in the sixth year.
The object of the Centre is to provide developing countries "with
the capacity in their own administrations, through training
programs, and to give at affordable costs legal assistance to pursue
and defend their rights in the dispute settlement process."'1 2 4 The
ACWL sponsors said that the center would take up all defensive
panel cases (where the developing countries are defending themselves
against complaints), but would pursue complaints made by
developing countries only on merit, paying particular attention to
Article 3 of the DSU, which prefers that mutually agreed solutions be
reached.125
On Tuesday, November 30, 1999, during a ceremony in Seattle,
the ministers of Bolivia, Canada, Columbia, Demark, Dominican
Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Finland, Guatemala, Honduras, Hong
Kong China, Ireland, Italy, Kenya, the Netherlands, Nicaragua,
Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines,
Sweden, Thailand, Tunisia, the United Kingdom, Uruguay, and
Zimbabwe signed the "Agreement establishing the Advisory Centre
on WTO Law."' 2 6 This agreement entered into force on July 15, 2001,

118.
Poor States join hands at WTO, BAHRAIN TRIB. DAILY NEWS., Sept. 2, 2002,
available at http://www.bahraintribune.com/monbusi.asp?ArtNo5751.
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and the constituent meeting of its General Assembly was held on July
17, 2001.127 Thirty-two countries signed the agreement: nine
developed countries, twenty-two developing countries, and one
economy in transition. 128 The United Nations has designated forty
nations as "least-developed," and these nations do not have to accept
129
the Agreement establishing the Centre in order to use its services.
The creation of the ACWL marks the establishment of the "first
true center for legal aid within the international system. '130 Domestic
legal clinics, however, have been in existence for decades in
recognition of an unbalanced system that fails to allow the
economically disadvantaged equal access to justice. 131 Mike Moore,
the Director-General of the WTO noted that this inequality is result
of two factors:
(i) ...increased sophistication of the legal system and also of the court
system in most countries, and certainly in developed countries . . .
[which] has led to increased costs of litigation; (ii) continuing social
inequality which, combined with the increased costs just mentioned,
made for a restriction of access to justice for large parts of the
population, often precisely those social lawyers that were supposed to
132
be supported by new rules.

These same factors contribute to inequality in access to justice on the
international level, with its many rules and courts:
The WTO is a case in point: it has expanded the rules of international
trade manifold compared to the GATT and created a new "court"
system with a possibility of appeal. Accordingly, legal advice in this

about the development of the center. See McBride, supra note 3, at 92-93 ("Some
individual member states of the EU support the Centre, but the EU as a whole does
not ....The United States, for its part, has not clearly defined its position ... it seems
safe to infer that the U.S. is against the institution.").
127.
Press Release, Inaugurationof the Advisory Centre on WTO Law, available
at http://http://www.acwl.ch/e/tools/news-e.aspx.
128.
Id.
129.
Id.
130.
Mike Moore, Address at the Official Opening of the Advisory Centre for
WTO Law (Oct. 5, 2001), available at http:// http://www.acwl.ch/e/tools/news-e.aspx.
Moore stated that:
[Ilndividuals appearing as defendants before War Crimes Tribunals have
always been able to call upon pro bono legal aid. The International Court of
Justice has a small fund out of which costs of legal assistance can be paid for
countries that need such help. But today marks the first time a true legal aid
center has been established w/in the international legal system, with a view to
combating the unequal possibilities of access to international justice as between
States.
131.
132.
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sector is very expensive. Thus creating considerable problems of access
33
to justice for developing countries. 1

The goal of the Advisory Centre is to provide "training and legal
assistance in WTO matters to its developing country Members and all
least developed countries. ' 134 The WTO is a complex system of rights
and obligations, supported by a binding dispute settlement
mechanism to ensure compliance. Meaningful participation in the
WTO requires an understanding of these rights and obligations and
the ability to participate in its dispute settlement mechanism. 13 5 The
enforcement of rights should not depend upon economic strength, but
136
upon the validity of a legal claim under the WTO Agreement.
Unfortunately, many Members face considerable problems making
these legal claims due to "lack of expertise and human resources in
this particular field of international law."'1 37 The Centre is a response
"to the urgent need of developing countries and economies in
transition to build up their legal expertise in order to be able to
138
participate more fully in the WTO.'
A. The Logistics of the ACWL
The Advisory Centre is currently established in Geneva as an
international organization independent from the WTO. 139 Although
the ACWL is described as part of the dispute settlement system of the
WTO, "it must also remain independent of the WTO and its Members
if it is to fulfill its role effectively."'140 Frieder Roessler, the Executive
Director of the ACWL, describes the Centre as, "a masterpiece of
checks and balances," while the ACWL retains financial
independence through its large endowment fund of nearly twenty
million Swiss francs, it is also subject "to close budgetary scrutiny by
14 1
its Members.'
In addition to providing legal advice, the Centre organizes
seminars and offers internships to government officials from
developing country members and least-developed countries. 142 The
purpose of these seminars, and especially the internships, is to
provide continuing education to individuals in developing country
governments in hopes that they can develop the level of expertise
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necessary to represent themselves in the future. 143 As the executive
director of the ACWL stated at its inauguration:
I believe the Centre's comparative advantage will be its day-to-day
involvement in WTO dispute settlement proceedings. Its niche may
therefore very well be on-the-job training of interns as well as
information sessions, circulars and seminars to disseminate the
knowledge that the Centre acquires through its own practical
experience.144

The executive director believes that "the Centre should remain a
relatively small organization and rely on outside expertise whenever
the demand for its services exceeds its capacity to provide them to
best achieve the ACWL's aims"145 The small size will help maintain
the desired flexibility and enable it to quickly respond to the requests
of clients. 146 Despite the small number of full-time staff members, the
Centre will still have the ability to obtain the expertise necessary best
to serve its users:
The Centre may finance not only the services of legal experts but also
those of technical experts. Its founders have created a Technical
Expertise Trust Fund to help defray part of the costs of technical
expertise to prepare the underlying technical dossier in fact-intensive
147
dispute settlement proceedings.

The ACWL's Charging Policy (Annex IV) explains the way that
148
the countries using the Centre are expected to pay for its services.
The billing policy reflects an attempt to strike a balance between
several of the goals of the Centre: the ability to pay on the basis of an
objective scale, promoting settlement of disputes and avoiding
149
frivolous cases, and creating incentives to become ACWL members.
Incentives to become founding members include discounts on
services, and a higher priority when the Centre is asked to assist
multiple parties to a dispute. 150 The fees for the Centre are "set at

143.

See Jackson, supra note 86, noting that:

[O]ne of the ingenious facets of the procedures established by the new Advisory
Center is that it combines its assistance for advocacy with a moderate mission
of training. Part of this training can be accomplished by asking an assisted
country to provide a person who will be a sort of 'intern,' working with the
Advisory Centre staff on the case for his or her country, and thus receiving
experience in that process.
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levels sufficiently low to ensure that also [sic] poor countries can
assert their WTO rights but also high enough to ensure that the
Centre's services are not wasted." 15 1 One basic rule is that no country
will be entitled to free service. 152 However, free counseling and pretrial consulting is available for founding members and for least153
developed countries for a certain fixed number of hours per year.
Developing countries that are founding members are "classified
according to their share in world trade (using data for calculating
WTO contributions) with an upward correction for GNP per capita as
classified by the World Bank in three categories.' 54 Least-developed
countries are in a separate category. 155 The following is a chart
156
established by the Centre to assess fees.
Hourly Rates
ACWL MEMBERS

Base Rate- $250

Discount Rate

Category A

$200

20%

Category B

$150

40%

Category C

$100

60%

Least Developed

$25

90%

NON-FOUNDING USERS
Category A

$350

Access but no Priority

Category B

$300

Category C

$250

The annual expenditure for the ACWL is estimated at $1.7
million. 15 7 The funding for the Centre will come from three main
sources: user fees, revenues from the endowment fund beginning in
158
year six, and multiyear donor contributions for the first five years.
There may also be voluntary contributions from not-for-profit private
organizations for specific activities. 159 The Advisory Centre is
160
expected to be financially independent in the sixth year.
The Advisory Centre is managed by a General Assembly,
consisting of developing countries, economies in transition, and
developed countries that make contributions to the endowment fund

151.
152.
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Power Point Presentation on the Advisory Centre on WTO Law, supra note

153.
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Van der Borght, supra note 136, at 726.
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or multi-year contributions. 161 Three countries represent the group of
least-developed nations that are not founding members. 162 The
General Assembly meets annually to assess the activities of the
ACWL, to elect the Management Board, and to adopt the budget
proposal. 163 The management board consists of one person for each of
the four established user groups, a person that represents developed
founding members, and an Executive Director. 164 The term of the
Board is two years, and each person is eligible for re-election. 165 The
Director-General of the WTO is also invited to partake in the annual
Management Board meeting in order to guarantee coordination
between the Centre and the WTO. 166 The main responsibilities of the
financial
"strategic direction,
Board
include:
Management
accountability, regular monitoring of activities, reviewing the
decisions of the Executive Director on appeal where assistance has
been denied, appointing the Executive Director (in consultation with
the founding members), and supervising the endowment fund that
1 67
[is] managed by a professional fund manager."'
The current staff of the ACWL consists of an Executive Director,
four lawyers, one office manager and one secretary.1 68 These
attorneys have been recruited internationally 169 and the selection
criteria are quite stringent. 170 Each member of the staff is paid a
competitive salary and must adhere to a code of conduct. 171 There is
no incentive to prolong any cases or to solicit business. 172 The
Centre's Management Board has appointed Frieder Roessler, who
was previously a professor as well as the Director of the Legal Affairs
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Division of the GATT and the WTO, as the Executive Director. 173
While the Centre employs only a few full-time attorneys, this is an
improvement over the previous situation as "nearly one-quarter of
WTO members cannot afford to keep a single permanent
representative in Geneva, where the WTO is headquartered.' 1 74 The
plan is to increase the staff and capacity of the ACWL in accordance
175
with demand for services.

B. The Work of the ACWL in its First Year of Operation
The ACWL was able to do a substantial amount of work during
its first year in operation. 176 For instance, during this time period the
Centre supplied written analysis to six different nations, three of
them members of the ACWL, one least-developed country, and two
non-member developing countries. 177 Three members requested the
Centre analyze the merits of potential WTO cases. 178 One member
made two separate requests for such analysis and after careful
examination of the issues, the ACWL recommended that the member
not bring either case to the DSB. 179 On a separate file, the ACWL
suggested that the scope of the potential case was too broad, and the
issue would be better resolved if it were narrowed.' 8 0 Finally, on a
fourth file brought to the Centre, which involved a challenge to the
GATS, the ACWL was examining the merits of the case at the time
the report on operations was made available. 18 The least-developed
country that solicited the ACWL was able to obtain advice on
bringing an anti-dumping case, as well as on its rights under Art.
XVIII of the GATT.18 2 Two non-member countries have also asked for
legal opinions: one country "requested an opinion on the WTO
consistency of trade policy proposals that its government was
considering tabling legislation."'18 3 On that matter, the ACWL
provided the nation with a written response on the potential
susceptibility of their proposed legislation to challenge by other WTO
member nations.i 8 4 Another nation "received a written opinion on the
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relationship between the GATS and the proposed investment
1 85
provisions in the FTA."'
In the first year of operations the ACWL's legal advice was also
solicited by four different nations in six different WTO cases:
1.

By Pakistan in the Appellate Body proceedings in United StatesTransitionalSafeguard Measure on Cotton Yarn.

2.

By Peru in the panel proceedings in EC-Trade Description for
Sardines

3.

By India in:

4.

a.

the case against the United States on Rules of Origin for
Textiles and Apparel Products

b.

the case against the European Community on Conditions on
the Grant of Tariff Preferencesto Developing Countries

c.

the case brought by the European Community and the United
States at the panel stage and the appeal of the panel report on
India-MeasuresAffecting the Automobile Industry.

By Ecuador in the panel proceedings in Turkey-Certain Import
186
Proceduresfor Fresh Fruit.

In India's complaint against the European Union and the United
States involving the automotive sector, a case that began in 1998-99
and lasted until 2001, Delhi paid the ACWL an hourly rate of $150 to
prepare submissions and statements. 187 An Indian diplomat said that
this was a savings of at least $100 an hour compared with the fees of
188
a private firm.
C. A Case Study in Depth: European Communities-TradeDescription
of Sardines
The Peruvian government solicited the help of the ACWL in a
dispute involving the European Community. The dispute between the
two governments involved the labeling of sardines for sale in the
European Community. 8 9 Two species of sardines were involved; one
species, Sardinops sagax is found mainly in the eastern Pacific off the
Peruvian and Chilean coasts. 190 The other species, Sardina
pilchardus Walbaum, is found mainly in European waters. 191 Until
1989, all species "of fish belonging to a large group of clupeid marine
fish sharing the characteristics of young pilchards" could be marketed

185.
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Kate Millar, Poorer WTO Countries Club Together as Trade Disputes
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to the European Community under the term "sardines. '192 However,
in 1989, the European Community changed this standard, adopting
Council Regulation (EEC) 2136/89 that held that only Sardina
pilchardus Walbaum could be labeled as "sardines." 193 Sardina
pilchardus Walbaum "happens to be of a species that populates
194
mainly European waters."
The origin of the dispute stems from a change in the German
labeling of Peruvian sardines. 195 A German company bought sardines
from Peru that were of the species Sardinops sagax and called them
"Pazifische Sardinen" (Pacific Sardines). 196 The label also indicated
the country of origin and the species of sardines. 197 In July 1999, the
company was told by German officials that it could not longer market
that species of fish under the name "sardines" because Article 2 of
Council Regulation No. 2136/89 mandates that only Sardina
pilcharduscan be marketed as "sardines. 198
The German company complained to the Director General
Cavaco of the Directorate General XIV, Fisheries, of the European
Commission that their label was consistent with an international
food-labeling standard and clearly indicated the pertinent
information to the consumer. 199 The Director General rejected the
company's complaints and noted that a failure to comply with the rule
might constitute a fine of DM 20,000.200 Thus, the German company
was forced to stop labeling the Peruvian fish as sardines.
In their first submission to the WTO, Peru noted that according
to Article 12.2 of the WTO Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade
(TBT Agreement), the members of the WTO "shall give particular
attention to developing country Members' rights under that
Agreement and shall take into account the trade needs of those
countries in the implementation of that Agreement. '20 1 Peru went on
to suggest that the European Community has not observed the
principles of that Article because it has "deliberately creat[ed] a
labeling requirement designed to protect its producers at the expense
of producers in developing countries in South America. '20 2 Peru
complained that the EC regulation has "contributed to a significant
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193.
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decline in the activities of sardine processing plants and a rise in
unemployment, coupled with the corresponding adverse social effects,
in many towns dependent upon this industry. '20 3 Moreover, Peru
alleged that the EC regulation was a violation of several provisions of
the WTO Agreement. 20 4 The thrust of Peru's legal argument was that
the EC labeling requirement is contrary to Article 2.4 of the TBT
Agreement:
Where technical regulations are required and relevant international
standards exist or their completion is imminent, Members shall use
them, or the relevant parts of them, as a basis for their technical
regulations except when such international standards or relevant parts
would be an ineffective or inappropriate means for the fulfillment of the
legitimate objectives pursued, for instance because of fundamental
climatic or geographical factors or fundamental technological
205
problems.

Peru's first submission to the panel purported to demonstrate
three main points regarding how the labeling of sardines is
inconsistent with Article 2.4 of the TBT agreement:
(a) it constitutes a technical regulation within the meaning of the TBT
Agreement; (b) international standards relevant to regulation exist; and
(c) the EC failed to base the regulation on those standards even though
they would be an effective and appropriate means for the fulfillment of
206
the objective of market transparency that the EC claims to pursue.

The international standard referred to by Peru is the "CODEX
STAN 94" adopted by Codex Alimentarious Commission of the Food
20 7
and Agriculture Organization and the World Health Organization.
The standard for sardines is set out in paragraph 6 and states:
6.

LABELING
In addition to the provision of the Codex General Standard for the
Labeling of Prepackaged Foods (CODEX STAN 1-1985, Rev. 3-1999) the
following provisions shall apply:
6.1 NAME OF THE FOOD
The name of the products shall be:
(i) "Sardines to be reserved exclusively for Sardina
pilchardus (Walbaum); or
(ii) "X Sardines" of a country, a geographic area, the species,
or the common name of the species in accordance with
the law and custom of the country in which the product is
208
sold, ad in a manner not to mislead the consumer.

6.1.1
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The dispute over the labeling went on for some time before Peru
went to the DSB. Beginning early on, Peru felt that they were putting
far more effort into resolving the dispute than the European
Community, which Peru felt was being uncooperative. 20 9 Peru
formally requested that the European Community hold consultations
regarding their dispute. 210 These consultations, which were held on
May 31, 2001, failed to resolve the labeling issue.2 11 Peru then
requested that the DSB convene a Panel to examine the matter on
July 24, 2001.212 The European Community and Peru then entered
into agreements regarding the composition of the panel. 213 However,
these negotiations were also unsuccessful, and Peru was forced to
the
request that the Director-General of the WTO determine
214
composition of the panel pursuant to Article 8:9 of the DSU.
In Peru's first submission to the DSB, Peru noted that for two
years it had "attempted to resolve the dispute amicably." 215 Peru
claimed that the European Community "ignored" all of its proposals
and "did not once respond to Peru's request for an explanation of the
justification of the labeling requirement in terms of paragraphs 2 to 4
of Article 2 of the TBT Agreement, notwithstanding the EC's
obligation to provide such an explanation under Article 2.5 of the TBT
2 16
Agreement.
In the same submission, Peru told the panel that it felt that the
European Community was disingenuous in several of its
statements. 2 17 Peru was primarily concerned with the fact that after
two years of failed attempts to reach a solution, when Peru finally
requested that the DSB establish a panel, the European Community
claimed that it was ready to seek a solution, but that they were in the
process "of collecting all the necessary information concerning this
matter in order to respond to the questions asked by Peru [but were]
disappointed about Peru's hasty decision to request establishment a
of a panel. '218 The European Community went on to oppose the
establishment of the panel and claimed that they "hoped that the
'219
delay would enable the parties to find a mutually agreed solution.
Peru claimed that there was a "glaring discrepancy" between the
European Community's conduct in the case and their assertions:
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Peru was surprised that, in spite of recent statements by the EC Trade
Commissioner reaffirming the EC's commitment to ensuring that the
interests and needs of developing countries were a core component of
the multilateral trading system and were fully incorporated in the
context of a fresh round of trade negotiations, the EC was
implementing the provision which was not only in breach of WTO
commitments, but was also severely detrimental to Peru's fishing
industry, which was one of the key sectors of its economy and a major
220
source of employment.

Peru felt that the EC's statement regarding its commitment to the
needs of developing countries was insincere in that it did not "even
attempt to justify in terms of WTO law the impediments it creates to
the exports of developing countries. '2 21 Furthermore, because the EC
consumes more sardines than it is able to produce, Peru believed that
its lack of compliance with the WTO obligations was not only legally
and politically unacceptable, but that it was also commercially
222
unsound.
After the Panel considered all of the evidence brought by Peru,
the European Community, and several third-party participants, the
Panel distributed its decision to members of the WTO on May 29,
2002.223 The Panel held that the EC regulation was inconsistent with
Article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement, and exercised judicial economy
with respect to Peru's claims under Articles 2.1 and 2.2 of the TBT
Agreement and 111:4 of the GATT 1994.224 In light of its findings, the
Panel recommended that the DSB request the European Community
bring its measure into conformity with its obligations under the TBT
22 5
Agreement.
On June 25, 2002, the European Community notified the DSB of
its intention to appeal certain issues of law and legal interpretations
developed by the Panel. 226 Peru, in return, requested that the
Appellate Body exclude four of the nine issues raised by the European
Community in its Notice of Appeal, as Peru did not feel that they met
the requirements of Rule 20(2)(d) of the Working Procedures for
Appellate Review. 227 On appeal, the most important issues were
whether the Panel erred in finding the EEC 2136/89 is a "technical
regulation" within the meaning of Annex 1.1 of the TBT Agreement;
whether the panel erred by finding that Article 2.4 of the TBT
Agreement applies to existing measures, such as the EC regulation;
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whether the panel erred by finding that CODEX STAN 94-1981,
Rev.1-1995 (Codex Standard 94) is a "relevant international
standard" within the meaning of Article 2.4; whether the panel erred
in finding that Codex Stan 94 was not used "as a basis for" the EC
regulation; and whether the Panel correctly interpreted and applied
the second part of Article 2.4, which allows members not to use
international standards "as a basis for" their technical regulations
"when such standards or relevant parts would be an ineffective or
inappropriate means for the fulfillment of legitimate objectives
228
pursued.
In its decision written on September 26, 2002, the Appellate
Body upheld the Panel's ultimate conclusion that the EC regulation
violated the TBT Agreement. It upheld the Panel's finding that the
EC regulation is a "technical regulation" for purposes of the TBT
Agreement. 229 It also upheld the Panel's finding that the TBT
Agreement applies to existing measures that were adopted before the
TBT Agreement and that have not ceased to exist, such as the EC
regulation. 23 0 Additionally, the Appellate Body agreed with the
Panel's finding that Codex 94 is a "relevant international standard"
for purposes of Article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement, and that it was not
used "as a basis for" the EC regulation.2 3 ' Finally, while the
Appellate Body reversed the Panel's finding that the European
Community had to prove that Codex Stan 94 is an "ineffective or
inappropriate" means to fulfill the 'legitimate objectives" pursued by
the European Community, 23 2 it held that Peru had produced
sufficient evidence and legal arguments to show that Codex Stan 94
is not "ineffective or inappropriate" to fulfill the "legitimate
objectives" of the EC regulation. 233 Thus, the Appellate Body
recommended that the DSB request the European Community bring
the EC regulation into conformity with Article 2.4 of the TBT
2 34
Agreement.
Peru, with the help of the Advisory Centre, was successful in
proving that the European Community had violated the WTO
Agreement. 23 5 This decision marked the first Appellate Body
proceeding in which a nation was represented by the ACWL. 23 6 The
dispute between Peru and the European Community was the first
major victory for the Advisory Centre, and its outcome was very
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significant to the Peruvian economy. This success has been called "a
landmark case in the fight against protectionism," 237 and has shown
"that smaller countries can benefit from WTO rulings if they have the
legal firepower to match the bigger power blocs. ' 238 Moreover, one
author has noted that this case proves that Roessler, the Executive
Director of the ACWL, has "few equals as a litigator before WTO
'23 9
panels and the Appellate Body.

IV. THE REACTION

OF THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE UNITED STATES
TO THE

ACWL

Despite the success of the Advisory Centre, both the United
States the European Union have not been forthcoming with support.
In the initial political process of establishing the Centre, the
European Union was asked to support the organization but "did not
like the idea very much. '2 40 In fact, developing countries have even
charged that the European Commission, the executive arm of the
European Union, "has tried to sabotage the ACWL. ''2 41 These
countries suggest that the Commission is afraid that the Centre
would allow developing countries to bring claims that would
challenge what many see as the European Union's protectionist
policies embodied in its Common Agricultural Policy or "the
environmental and social conditions applied to its preferential trade
arrangements for poor nations. '242 The European Union's reaction to
the Centre has been widely criticized:
The European Union likes to pose as an enlightened aid donor and
champion of developing economies' interests. It also regularly holds
itself up as a model of the virtues of universal justice and the primacy
of the rule of law. But the European Commission is making a mockery
of both claims by obstinately resisting a modest proposal to help the
243
world's poorest countries gain a fair hearing in trade disputes.
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It is charged that the Commission's opposition to the Centre
stems in part from its desire to assert its authority as an institution
over member states in matters of policy. 244 In fact, when the Centre
was initially being discussed, the Commission was said to be willing
to sue members for contributing funds to the ACWL, claiming that
these donations would "weaken co-operation in the common EU
interest. '245 However, some trade officials claim that the
Commission's real goal in attempting to prevent members from
supporting the Centre was to leave it under-funded and unable to get
246
off the ground.
The Commission, for its part, has said that it is opposed to the
ACWL simply because better solutions are available, and because an
independent center is unnecessary. 24 7 Instead, the Commission has
suggested strengthening the ability of the WTO itself to give legal
advice to developing countries. 24 8 Its proposal entails establishing a
separate "independent unit" within the WTO Secretariat to assist the
developing countries in the dispute settlement system. 249 The
Commission says that although the WTO currently lacks the
technical capacity to provide legal services to its members, this
capacity can, and should, be increased by adding more legal
counselors. 250 These services, unlike the Advisory Centre, would be
available through the WTO under Article 27.2 of the DSU rather than
independent of it.251
The Commission's proposal has been met with considerable
criticism. First, it is argued that the lack of technical capacity of the
WTO is not the only issue, or indeed the most relevant or important
issue. 252 Many developing countries argue that the Commission's
proposal could not possibly meet the needs of the developing countries
because WTO officials, such as the Secretariat must necessarily
remain neutral. 25 3 The United States, a vocal opponent of the EU
proposal, noted that if the Secretariat provides "case-specific advise
on the strengths and weaknesses of particular arguments, that
appears to risk jeopardizing the neutrality of the WTO Secretariat
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that is guaranteed by DSU Art. 27.2."254 As one critic explained,
"Developing countries need partisan legal advise . . .[b]y definition
' 255
that cannot be given by the WTO.
Moreover, scholars have noted that the WTO as a body still lacks
credibility in the eyes of many developing countries. 256 There is a
general distrust of the WTO and a feeling that the Secretariat "is too
weak to resist pressures from its more powerful members, especially
the United States and the European Union. 25 7 A final criticism of the
Commission's proposal is that it does not allow developing countries
to receive legal advice in the most expensive and difficult DSU
process:
Under the proposal ... the unit would not represent WTO Members in
panel proceedings, but only in the pre-panel stages. This limitation
raises serious questions about whether the proposal would adequately
address the constraints on developing country participation in the DSU,
since panel proceedings are the most resource-intensive phase of the
258
proceeding.

To make matters worse, some officials have accused the European
Commission of being aware of all of these problems when it made its
proposal, lending support to the view that the Commission's
opposition to the Advisory Centre is disingenuous or even
259
mischievous.
While the United States has been a less vocal opponent of the
Advisory Centre it has not supported the ACWL. Prior to the
unveiling of the Centre, the United States refused to commit any
money, 26 0 and its response to the Centre's proposal can best be
characterized as "lukewarm."261 Dutch Foreign Trade Minister Otto
Genee said that his ministry and the Columbian Minister for Trade
both sent the United States letters explaining the ACVL and urging
them to join, but the United States has "never shown any interest in
becoming a member of the ACWL. ''262 In an e-mail correspondence,
Genee noted, "The idea of funding an organization that may attack
the United States in dispute settlement is apparently abhorrent and
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too much. ' 26 3 One author has suggested that the United States should
not support the ACWL for that very reason. 26 4 He notes that:
It would be difficult for any U.S. administration to defend to its
taxpayers or the U.S. Congress a proposal to spend tax dollars on an
institution created to assist others in challenges to U.S. trade law or
regulations, or to resist the U.S. trade complaints filed with the
WTO.

265

While the United States has not yet contributed funds to support
the Centre, government officials are nonetheless being presented with
information regarding the Centre and its work. Congress recently
heard testimony by the American Bar Association Section of
International Law and Practice, about the Centre, its neutrality with
regard to the WTO, and its advantages to developing countries:
Developing countries' inability to make full use of the DSU undermines
the legitimacy of the DSU and the world trading system and may
frustrate efforts to amicably settle disputes . . . current statistics
suggest, at the very least, a strong possibility of relative
underutilization of the WTO dispute settlement mechanism by the
266
developing world.

V. CONCLUSION

It does not make sense that neither the United States nor the
European Union has shown any interest in supporting the Advisory
Centre on WTO Law. Both the United States and the European
Union have a history of providing equal access to their domestic
justice systems to the poor. Some feel that this equality of access
legitimizes their justice systems in these countries and sets them
apart from most other countries.
The United States is a country that prides itself on offering all
persons a chance to attain justice in the court system, despite the
financial situation of the individual. In fact, "U.S. national rhetoric is
replete with guarantees the United States provides equal justice ...
the entrance frieze of the U.S. Supreme Court building bears the
promise of "Equal Justice Under the Law," which appears constantly
on television and other media. '267 Furthermore, the programs that
guarantee equal justice "occupy a unique status among the many
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social programs and other societal goals our government is asked to
pursue . . . equal justice is at the essential core of the American
'268
system of government.
Likewise, equal justice has a long history and occupies a central
role in Europe. In England, the right to counsel dates back centuries.
The English Parliament enacted a statute in 1495 guaranteeing free
counsel for impoverished litigants in common law courts: "This
'Statute of Henry VII' created a right to free counsel for indigent
English litigants and empowered the courts to appoint lawyers to
provide the representation without compensation." 269 European
countries have now gone farther than the United States in the field of
equal justice, offering free legal service to indigent persons in civil as
well as criminal cases. 270 The right to free legal advice in civil cases is
now a "supra-national" constitutional right based on the outcome of
Airey v. Ireland, a case decided in 1979 by the European Court of
271
Human Rights.
The European Court of Human Rights "interpreted the fair
hearing guarantee of the European convention on Human Rights to
require that member governments appoint free counsel for poor
litigants engaged in civil cases." 27 2 The only exception to this rule is if
the forum is "simple enough to afford a fair hearing without legal
assistance." 2 73 The result in Airey was partially predicated on the fact
that Europe's justice system is based upon the social contract theory
of government:
One of the fundamental tenets of social contract theory is that citizens
would not voluntarily surrender their natural right to resolve their
disputes with others through force unless they were guaranteed
fairness in the sovereign's forum. The government violates this compact
if the forums set up to resolve disputes deny a fair chance to those who
cannot afford lawyers and fail to provide lawyers to those citizens. To
live up to the equal justice prerequisite of the social contract the
government must either simplify the forums drastically or provide
274
lawyers to those who cannot afford them.

Despite the fact that the United States and the European Union
have not financially contributed to the Advisory Centre, many other
developed nations have realized that supporting the Centre will be
beneficial to all members of the WTO, including wealthy
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industrialized nations. The reasoning that the United States and the
European Union cannot justify supporting an organization that will
challenge their trade laws ignores the fact that aiding the ACWL
would lend legitimacy to the WTO as a whole, benefiting all its
members. As one author notes, "[the ACWL] offers the very services
that overcome serious trepidations by developing and least-developed
states regarding the cost and procedural concerns of defending and
pursuing complaints under the DSU. ''275 This criticism also ignores
the fact that one of the primary functions of the ACWL is to train the
developing countries to represent themselves and to aid them in
defending complaints brought by other nations. Moreover, the Centre
carefully screens potential complaints, and has proven that it will not
bring every complaint suggested by developing countries. 276 The
Centre's practice of careful screening may even reduce complaints
leveled at the United States and the European Union.
While the European Union as a whole has not contributed any
money, several individual members of the European Union have
donated a substantial amount: "The Netherlands is the main
financial backer of the [Advisory Centre], providing the Centre with
$2.25 million in initial support, with Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and
the United Kingdom providing an additional $1 million apiece. 2 77
Ireland, Italy, Finland, and Canada have also joined and made
contributions to the ACWL. 278 Other industrialized nations such as
Japan and New Zealand have also shown interest in supporting the
279
Advisory Centre.
Important legal organizations within the United States have also
recognized the importance of legitimizing the WTO in the eyes of
developing countries and seem to endorse the United States
contributing to the Centre. When testifying before Congress, the
American Bar Association did not unequivocally recommend that the
United States support the ACWL, but they did note the importance of
ensuring that developing countries have access to the DSU:
Because the support of developing countries for WTO dispute
settlement is a crucial element in their support for the WTO as an
institution, the ABA/SILP believes that it is important for the United
States to work with other WTO members to address seriously and
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promptly additional ways to enhance the ability of developing countries
280
to participate in WTO dispute settlement.

Furthermore, the ABA noted that, "Promoting effective
participation of the developing countries in WTO dispute resolution
would be consistent with the U.S. government's traditional role in
28 1
promoting the rule of law in international trade.
Although the establishment of the Advisory Centre is a fairly
recent development, many developing countries are already
recognizing the valuable help that the Centre can provide. The
Centre's victory before the Appellate Body in the Peruvian sardines
case has been especially instrumental in bringing the work of the
Centre to the attention of nations that can use the Advisory Centre's
help the most. In a recent interview, Yasuhei Taniguchi, a trade
diplomat, said that, "it has been proven in the case of Peru that the
Geneva-based advisory law center could help developing countries in
the fight to protect their trade rights against disputes with developed
28 3
countries."28 2 He went on to note, "Yes (the system really works).
Some developing countries have already taken note of the
Centre's ability to assist them in disputes against wealthy nations.
One of the biggest recent developments, and likely a direct result of
the Centre's work, involves a planned complaint by western and
central African nations over cotton. 28 4 If the case is brought to the
WTO, it would be the first time that the least-developed countries
have been involved in a dispute before the WTO. 28 5 The agriculture
ministers of the countries said that they are working with the ACWL
28 6
and would begin the process for presenting a complaint to the DSB.
The target of their complaint will be the United States and the
European Union. 28 7 The African nations complain that while their
cotton is priced competitively, they are suffering because the United
States and the European Union pay their cotton producers large
subsidies. 288 Frieder Roessler, director of the ACWL, acknowledged
the importance of this case saying that due to a lack of funds and
information, "[t]here's never been a case brought, or brought against
'289
[east-developed countries] so far."
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The ACWL has the potential to benefit every nation that
participates in the WTO, not just developing countries. The ACWL
legitimizes the WTO as a whole. When parties are equally
represented, the entire system is legitimated, and legitimacy,
especially in the eyes of developing countries, has been a problem
that has plagued the WTO for years: "If the independent way of
arbitrating is such an important feature of the WTO, which it is, then
we also have to make sure that its access and affordability is such
that all members can take advantage of that so-called jewel in the
290
crown."
The ACWL is, so far, the best way for developing countries to
participate in the system because it allows them to receive quality
legal advice on trade matters that they would not otherwise be able to
afford. It is the best way for them to participate in a system that, in
their view, has not been giving them what they were promised. This
is an organization that the United States and the European Union
should be proud to support.
Andrea Greisberger*

290.
Millar, supra note 187.
* J.D. Candidate, Vanderbilt University Law School,
2004; B.A., University of
Arizona.

